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MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
   In this appeal from the denial of a petition for the 
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, brought pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2254, Darryl S. Hill denies that he knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his constitutional right to a jury trial, 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and right to 
confront his accusers, when he entered a guilty plea to charges 
of armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery and to the 
felony murder of a police officer.  Unfortunately, during the 
plea colloquy in the New Jersey criminal proceeding the judge did 
not apprise Hill that he would be waiving these rights.  The 
specific issue we must decide is whether Hill's plea nonetheless 
comported with the Supreme Court's directive in Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), that a guilty plea not be accepted 
absent an affirmative showing that it was knowing and voluntary.  
 This matter is further complicated because the district 
court declined to adopt the Report and Recommendation of the 
magistrate judge who, having conducted an evidentiary hearing on 
the issue of whether Hill knew of the constitutional rights he 
was waiving at the time he entered his plea, concluded that his 
plea was not knowing and voluntary.  The district court did not 
hold an evidentiary hearing but instead determined from its de 
novo review of the record that despite the state court's failure 
to address Hill's constitutional rights, Hill's plea complied 
with the requirements of Boykin.   
 
I. 
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 Although the dispositive facts involve the plea 
colloquy and discussions with defense counsel, we also set forth 
the underlying events of the crime as they inform our decision. 
 On April 3, 1979, Hill, Ronald Evans, Craig Carter and 
Michael Jones drove from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to Hammonton, 
New Jersey and committed an armed robbery at Raso's Liquor Store. 
They stole approximately $4,000 in cash, a revolver, four 
shotguns, a case of shotgun shells and several wristwatches. When 
they fled the scene in a 1973 Ford Thunderbird, they were pursued 
by Patrolman Daniel Chernavsky of the Medford Police Department.  
During the chase, Michael Jones and Ronald Evans wounded 
Patrolman Chernavsky.  Shortly thereafter, when their car crashed 
into a wall, Hill, Evans, Carter and Jones separated. Sergeant 
Frank Fullerton of the Moorestown Police Department pursued Jones 
and was shot twice in the stomach and once in the right shoulder.  
Sergeant Fullerton died from these bullet wounds nearly a month 
later on June 1, 1979.  Hill was not present when the fatal shots 
were fired, although he heard the shots.   
 On April 3 or 4, 1979, Hill, Jones, Carter and Evans 
were arrested and charged with multiple counts of armed robbery, 
conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and murder and/or felony 
murder.  Hill provided a statement regarding his participation in 
the armed robbery.  At the time, Hill was 18 years old with an 
eleventh grade education, and read on the level of a seventh 
grader.  His only prior involvement with the criminal justice 
system as an adult was in Philadelphia, where he was charged with 
shoplifting, plead guilty, was fined $65 and was put on 
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probation, all without the aid of counsel.  Shortly after Hill's 
arrest, John L. Madden, Esq., was appointed as counsel for Hill. 
Hill became frustrated that his case had not been set for trial 
and wrote a letter to the Burlington County assignment judge 
complaining of Madden's failure to meet and discuss the case with 
him and to request that his case be moved along.   
 By letter dated October 11, 1979, to Hill's mother, 
Madden introduced himself as Hill's appointed counsel and 
discussed Hill's options of entering a guilty plea versus trial. 
In this letter to Mrs. Hill, Madden informed her that the 
prosecutor's office was adamant against a plea bargain because a 
police officer had been killed.  Madden opined that it was 
useless for Hill to plead guilty without a recommendation on 
sentence from the prosecutor and that Hill had little to lose by 
standing trial given his admitted involvement in the armed 
robbery and the application of the felony murder rule to Hill, 
which would mandate a life sentence if Hill was convicted. Madden 
also stated that he had requested that Hill's case be set for 
trial.  
 Madden then wrote a letter directly to Hill on October 
25, 1979, informing him that the prosecutor had refused to enter 
into any type of plea bargain and would not conduct Hill's trial 
until the trigger man had been tried.  Madden indicated his 
agreement with the prosecutor that Hill's trial should not 
commence until after the trigger man was tried.  Madden further 
advised Hill to remain patient because his trial would probably 
not occur for an additional two months.  Expressing his 
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disappointment that Hill had felt compelled to write to the 
assignment judge complaining of lack of contact with counsel, 
Madden discussed his role as Hill's counsel.  He indicated that 
he was working on Hill's case with the same diligence and effort 
he expended in all cases but did not have time to contact Hill 
simply to state that he had nothing concrete to report; however, 
he would visit Hill in jail well in advance of trial to discuss 
the case and trial strategy.  Madden further stated that he did 
not want to proceed absent Hill's full confidence and 
cooperation.  Madden opined that Hill was not "in good shape" 
given that the application of the felony murder rule would permit 
a jury to find Hill guilty of first degree murder but that Madden 
could present an argument to the jury that would preclude the 
application of the felony murder rule to Hill.  Madden requested 
that all future questions about the case be directed to him via 
letter given that Madden was quite busy and was usually out of 
the office when Hill would be able to call him.  Finally, Madden 
reiterated that if Hill was dissatisfied with him, Madden would 
attempt to get him another lawyer. 
 Two weeks later, on November 6, 1979, Madden informed 
Hill by letter that his trial probably would not occur until 
January of 1980 and that the prosecutor wanted Hill to testify 
against the trigger man in exchange for a recommendation as to 
Hill's sentence.  Madden noted that although no definite numbers 
had been agreed upon, the prosecutor hinted at a recommended 
sentence of 20-25 years, which Madden believed was reasonable 
given that the armed robbery charge alone authorized the 
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imposition of a maximum sentence of 30 years.  Madden asked for 
Hill's reaction to the possible 20-25 year sentence.   
 Hill immediately responded to Madden's letter, 
expressing his view that the proposed sentence of 20-25 years 
seemed inappropriate and inquiring as to whether Madden could 
continue his efforts on the plea bargain to obtain a 10-15 year 
sentence.  Hill stated his agreement that it would be better to 
wait until after the trigger man was tried.  Madden received 
Hill's response on November 10, 1979. 
 In the ensuing weeks, Hill apparently agreed to testify 
against his co-defendants, causing the others to decide to plead 
guilty.  On January 28, 1980, the trial court conducted a hearing 
to determine the admissibility of Hill's confession given a 
question raised as to the authenticity of Hill's signature on the 
Miranda form.  Hill was present for this hearing.  The court 
ruled that Hill's confession was admissible. 
 On January 30, 1980, Hill entered a plea of non vult to 
charges of felony murder, armed robbery and conspiracy to commit 
robbery.  The parties do not dispute that the plea colloquy 
failed to apprise Hill of the constitutional rights delineated in 
Boykin that Hill would waive by pleading guilty.  The plea 
colloquy between Hill and the New Jersey trial court in pertinent 
part was as follows: 
THE COURT: Darryl Hill, how old are 
you? 
 
 HILL: Nineteen, sir. 
 
 THE COURT: Where do you live? 
 
8 
HILL: 1631 North Veston Street, 
Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania. 
 
 THE COURT: How far have you gone in school? 
 
 HILL: Eleventh grade, sir. 
 
 . . . . 
 
THE COURT: Do you understand, sir, 
these are the crimes that 
we are talking about? 
 
 HILL: Yes, sir. 
 
THE COURT: Do you understand that 
Mr. Madden tells me that 
you wish to change your 
not guilty plea to guilty 
with respect to those 
counts of those 
indictments? 
 
HILL: Yes, sir. 
 
 THE COURT: Is anyone forcing you to do this? 
 
 HILL: No, sir. 
 
THE COURT: Other than what the two 
attorneys have just 
stated on the record has 
anyone else promised you 
any particular deals, 
rewards or sentences for 
pleading guilty? 
 
 HILL: No, sir. 
 
THE COURT: Do you realize that for 
these offenses you could 
be subject to life 
imprisonment plus one 
hundred twenty-eight 
years plus fines up to 
twenty-six thousand 
dollars? 
 
HILL: Yes, sir. 
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THE COURT: Are you guilty of these 
offenses? 
 
 HILL: Yes, sir. 
 
THE COURT: You were in court with me 
and heard the taped 
confessions that were 
read into the record 
yesterday, were you not? 
 
 HILL: Yes, sir. 
 
THE COURT: Were they essentially 
true and correct? 
 
 HILL: Yes, sir. 
 
 . . . . 
 
THE COURT:  Allright, I find these 
actions to be voluntary. 
I will grant the defense 
motion for retraction of 
the not guilty pleas with 
respect to the counts 
enumerated only and in 
[their] place instead 
will enter pleas of 
guilty. 
 
(A 9-15).  The state recommended a concurrent sentence on all 
charges, which would impact Hill's eligibility for parole.  Hill 
was sentenced to concurrent sentences of life imprisonment for 
felony murder and to 31-45 years for the remaining offenses. 
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 Having exhausted his state remedies,1 Hill filed a 
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 22542 in January of 1989.  The district court ordered 
an evidentiary hearing and referred the matter to a magistrate 
judge to determine whether Hill knew of the constitutional rights 
he was waiving by entering a plea of guilty.  The magistrate 
judge conducted the evidentiary hearing on March 22, 1993 at 
which Hill testified on his own behalf and Madden testified for 
the State.   
 Under oath Hill described his confusion at the time of 
his plea hearing:  that although many legal terms were spoken, he 
                     
1
 Hill moved for, but was denied, reconsideration of his 
sentence in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Burlington County, 
Criminal Division.  The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate 
Division, affirmed the sentence on February 24, 1984 and the New 
Jersey Supreme Court denied certification on May 22, 1984.  On 
January 23, 1985, Hill filed a petition for post-conviction 
relief in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Burlington County, 
Criminal Division, and was denied relief after a hearing on 
November 19, 1986.  The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate 
Division affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief on 
October 23, 1987.  The New Jersey Supreme Court denied 
certification on March 10, 1988. 
2
 Hill's original petition alleged that his plea was not 
made knowingly and intelligently because the New Jersey trial 
court failed to advise him of his constitutional rights pursuant 
to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and his 
counsel misrepresented to him the terms of the plea agreement. On 
August 10, 1990, the district court denied the petition, ruled 
that Hill's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel lacked 
merit and noted that Rule 11 only governs proceedings in federal 
court.  Nonetheless, the court recognized the importance of the 
constitutional rights at stake and granted Hill leave to amend 
his petition to state an appropriate claim regarding his lack of 
awareness of his constitutional rights at the time of his guilty 
plea.  On May 20, 1992, Hill filed an amended petition alleging 
that his plea was not knowingly and intelligently made in 
violation of his constitutional rights and that his counsel was 
ineffective.  
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did not understand their meaning or the procedures of the court 
and how they affected him.  Specifically, Hill stated:  
I mean, I've heard of Book em Dano.  I've 
heard of trial.  I heard of you're under 
arrest.  I heard a lot of things, but when it 
comes down to what those things define, or 
are they or are they not rights that I have, 
that understanding I did not have at the 
time. . . . 
 
(A 72-73).  Hill further testified that Madden never advised him 
of his rights to a trial by jury or to any other rights, 
including the privilege against self-incrimination.   
 Madden then testified that it was his general practice 
at his initial meeting with his client to review the indictment, 
the offenses, the applicable penalties and plea bargaining.  He 
could not recall whether he specifically advised Hill of the 
privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a trial by 
jury and the right to confront his accusers.  Madden testified: 
I honestly do not know if I specifically 
articulated to Mr. Hill that he had a right 
to a jury trial.  
 
 . . . . 
 
But I -- I can tell you as a . . . general 
practice, that it -- I always discuss [rights 
under the Sixth Amendment in terms of 
confrontation,] with -- with clients, yes. 
 
(A 94-96).  Madden further testified that he apprised Hill of his 
privilege against self-incrimination in conjunction with Hill's 
option of testifying against the trigger man in exchange for a 
plea bargain.  Madden advised Hill to think long and hard about 
the plea and to confer with his family especially since there 
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would be no specific recommendation as to sentence.  Madden 
further testified that at the time of the plea, he reviewed with 
Hill the charges to which Hill was pleading guilty, the maximum 
punishment for those charges and that he could not guarantee 
Hill's sentence.  Madden did not discuss with Hill his 
constitutional rights; he stated that: 
I was confident then, as I am now, that he 
did understand that.  If it turns out that 
. . . it was also a requirement of the law, 
retroactively, that he be given this kind of 
exposition about additional aspects of his 
constitutional rights, then, as I said before 
I failed him. 
 
(A 108). 
 The magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation 
dated August 27, 1993, recommending that the district court find 
that Hill sustained his burden of showing that his plea was not 
intelligently and voluntarily made and, therefore, that his 
constitutional rights were violated.  The magistrate judge relied 
on the following factors in concluding that Hill's plea was not 
made intelligently and voluntarily: 
1.  Hill's uncontroverted testimony that he was not 
aware of the rights he was waiving when he plead 
guilty; 
 
2.  Hill's limited education; 
 
3.  Hill's prior criminal history that does not 
indicate a familiarity with this area of the law; 
 
4.   Madden's testimony that he could not recall 
advising Hill of his rights, but that he generally 
discussed those rights with clients; 
 
5.   the trial judge's failure to apprise Hill of the 
rights he was waiving by pleading guilty; and 
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6.   a plea form that did not contain an exposition of 
those rights.3 
 
  The district court issued a Memorandum and Order dated 
February 2, 1994 finding that Hill's plea was voluntary and 
knowing.  The district court conducted a de novo review of the 
written correspondence between Hill and Madden, which predated 
the guilty plea; the January 30, 1980 plea hearing transcript; 
and the transcript of the March 22, 1993 evidentiary hearing 
conducted by the magistrate judge.  After reviewing all of the 
correspondence between Hill and Madden, the district court 
focused on the October 26 and November 10 letters, concluding 
that Hill was aware of his right to a jury trial and that he 
voluntarily pursued a guilty plea.  The district court also 
determined that Madden's testimony further bolstered the fact 
that Hill's guilty plea was voluntary and knowing.  Finally, 
although the district court recognized that the state court 
failed to advise Hill of his constitutional rights, the district 
court found that the colloquy, when coupled with Madden's 
testimony and the written correspondence, evidenced that Hill's 
plea complied with Boykin. 
                     
3
 There was some confusion prior to the evidentiary 
hearing as to whether Hill signed an LR-27 plea form or an LR-28 
plea form, which superseded the LR-27 plea form.  The LR-27 did 
not contain a recitation of the constitutional rights that would 
be waived upon entering a plea of guilty.  Nor did the version of 
the LR-28 in use in 1980.  The LR-28 in use since 1984 which was 
supplied to the district court, however, contains specific 
references to the constitutional rights waived by entering a plea 
of guilty -- the right to a trial by jury, the right against 
self-incrimination and the right to confront witnesses.  The 
parties, however, stipulated to the magistrate judge that the 
1980 LR-27 was the version of the plea form that Hill signed. 
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 We review the district court's de novo review of the 
record on which the magistrate judge issued a Report and 
Recommendation, which included the transcript of the evidentiary 
hearing at which both Hill and Madden testified.  Our review of 
the district court's legal conclusions is plenary; we review 
factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard.  Bond v. 
Fulcomer, 864 F.2d 306, 309 (3d Cir. 1989).  Hill's appeal from a 
final order of the district court is timely; thus, our 
jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1291 and 2253 (West 
1993 and 1994).4   
 
II. 
 In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969), the 
Supreme Court made clear that no criminal defendant should plead 
guilty to a crime unless, and until, he has had explained to him 
and understands all of his constitutional rights and protections, 
including the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination 
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, the right to trial by jury, 
and the right to confront one's accusers.  In Boykin the Court 
                     
4
 On March 9, 1994, Hill filed a notice of appeal from 
the district court's February 2, 1994 Memorandum and Order 
"reversing" the Report and Recommendation, which was not an 
appealable order.  The district court issued a subsequent Order 
dated March 17, 1994, denying the petition for habeas corpus and 
certifying that there is no probable cause for appeal.  This was 
a final order from which an appeal could be taken.  See Fed. R. 
App. P. (4)(a)(2).  We deemed Hill's notice of appeal as a 
request for the issuance of a certificate of probable cause 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b), which we 
issued on November 11, 1994 as the issue presented in Hill's 
petition is not plainly frivolous.  See generally Barefoot v. 
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, reh'g denied, 464 U.S. 874 (1983).    
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instructed judges to ensure that a criminal defendant had a full 
understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences by 
"canvassing the matter" on the record, thereby providing an 
adequate record for any review sought by the criminal defendant 
and forestalling collateral attacks that seek to probe murky 
memories.  395 U.S. at 243-44.  It is exactly this situation that 
presents itself here where the state complains of its "impossible 
position of having to rebut countless allegations with little 
else but the faded memories of busy trial attorneys who have 
handled numerous cases since the original plea."  Respondent's 
Brief at 18.  We recognize that the New Jersey trial court 
practices5 have been revised since Hill's plea was entered in 
1980.  Nonetheless, regardless of the practices in place in 1980 
when Hill entered his plea, the trial court was bound to comply 
with the requirements of Boykin in accepting Hill's plea.   
 We have expressed concern regarding inexactitude by 
trial courts in accepting guilty pleas: 
[A]lthough starting from what superficially 
would appear to be two different premises for 
requiring an efficient plea process, it is 
clear that both society and the individual 
                     
5
 See generally Rule 3:9-2 of the New Jersey Rules 
Governing Criminal Practice: 
 
The court, in its discretion, may refuse to 
accept a plea of guilty and shall not accept 
such plea without first addressing the 
defendant personally and determining by 
inquiry of the defendant and others, in the 
court's discretion, that there is a factual 
basis for the plea and that the plea is made 
voluntarily, . . . with an understanding of 
the nature of the charge and the consequences 
of the plea. 
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defendant have arrived at an identical 
interest in the means by which their 
respective purposes are to be achieved -- an 
effective, thorough, complete and meaningful 
plea proceeding.  Imprecision in the manner 
in which these proceedings are conducted 
deserves the interests of both society and 
the criminal defendant.  On the one hand, a 
failure to properly apprise the criminal 
defendant of his rights leads to an 
unknowing, unintelligent and involuntary 
waiver.  On the other hand, to the extent 
that improperly administered pleas generate 
and encourage appeals which are time 
consuming, burdensome and difficult to 
process, the societal interests in 
rehabilitation, speedy justice, swift 
punishment and deterrence are thwarted. 
 
United States v. Carter, 619 F.2d 293, 296-97 (3d Cir. 1980).  It 
is incumbent upon any court accepting a guilty plea to ensure 
that the criminal defendant has been apprised of and understands 
the constitutional rights waived upon entry of a guilty plea: 
[T]he hallmark of our criminal justice system 
is fundamental fairness.  Fundamental 
fairness dictates that guilty plea 
proceedings be undertaken sensitively. 
 
Carter, 69 F.2d at 299.  Such sensitivity requires that, in the 
absence of testimony that a criminal defendant understands the 
constitutional rights he waives upon pleading guilty, a state 
trial court must engage in a colloquy on the record sufficient to 
ensure that the defendant has been apprised of his constitutional 
right to a jury trial, right to confront his accusers, and the 
privilege against self-incrimination.  Anything less fails to 
ensure that a criminal defendant has been adequately informed of 
his constitutional rights and renders the plea vulnerable to 
collateral attack. 
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 The failure to specifically articulate Boykin rights, 
however, is not dispositive if the circumstances otherwise 
establish that the plea was constitutionally acceptable.  United 
States v. Stewart, 977 F.2d 81, 85 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
113 S. Ct. 1433 (1993) (plea colloquy adequate despite trial 
court's failure to enumerate Boykin rights given that those 
rights were reviewed in prior plea colloquy that accrued only six 
weeks earlier).6   
 The critical issue here is whether the circumstances 
surrounding Hill's plea evidence that it was in fact knowing and 
voluntary; what Hill understood from the words spoken to and 
around him during court proceedings -- a question of fact.  Hill 
had the burden of persuasion to establish that his plea was 
neither intelligent nor voluntary.  Stewart, 977 F.2d at 85.  The 
district court determined that Hill failed to carry his burden in 
large part based on its review of the record of the evidentiary 
hearing and of the correspondence between Madden, Hill and Hill's 
                     
6
 In addition to Stewart, the district court relied on 
United States v. DeForest, 946 F.2d 523, 526 (7th Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1118 (1992) (involving review of both pre 
and post-Boykin guilty pleas for sentence enhancement purposes). 
DeForest involved in relevant part the review by the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit of a pre-Boykin plea where the 
trial judge failed to give the required constitutional warnings 
but asked the defendant about his prior convictions, education, 
mental state, the maximum penalty,and the facts of the offense. 
See Deforest, 946 F.2d at 524-25; Stewart, 977 F.2d at 85.  While 
the plea colloquy at issue is factually similar to one of the 
pre-Boykin cases discussed in DeForest, that plea was analyzed 
under a pre-Boykin standard of constitutionality.  Id., 946 F.2d 
at 525.  The court of appeals in DeForest in fact expressly 
declined to decide the adequacy of the one post-Boykin plea at 
issue.  See id. at 527.  Thus, DeForest is inapposite to the 
analysis of the adequacy of Hill's post-Boykin plea. 
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mother from October 11, 1979 through November 10, 1979, all 
predating Hill's plea by three months.     
 
III. 
A. 
 The district court reviewed the record developed before 
the magistrate judge to determine whether to accept the 
magistrate judge's recommendation that Hill's plea was not 
knowing and voluntary.  A district court may either accept the 
recommendation of a magistrate judge or reject the recommendation 
and reach an independent conclusion after hearing testimony and 
viewing witnesses.  Louis v. Blackburn, 630 F.2d 1105, 1110 (5th 
Cir. 1980).  The difficulty here is that the district court 
decided not to defer to the credibility determinations implicit 
in the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation -- that 
Hill's testimony that he did not understand his constitutional 
rights at the time of the plea was believable.7   
 A district court may not reject a finding of fact by a 
magistrate judge without an evidentiary hearing, where the 
finding is based on the credibility of a witness testifying 
before the magistrate judge and the finding is dispositive of an 
application for post-conviction relief involving the 
                     
7
 By Memorandum and Order dated February 2, 1994, the 
district court took an action which it described as "revers[ing]" 
the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation.  A Magistrate Judge's 
Report and Recommendation, however, is not something that is 
reversible; it is adopted, rejected or modified by the district 
court.  28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(West 1993).  See also supra at 
n.4. 
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constitutional rights of a criminal defendant.  See Blackburn, 
630 F.2d 1105; see generally Grassia v. Scully, 892 F.2d 16, 19 
(2d Cir. 1989) ("Had the district court rejected the magistrate 
judge's conclusions regarding the credibility of the central 
witnesses without hearing live testimony from those witnesses, 
troubling questions of constitutional due process would have been 
raised.").  Further, the Supreme Court expressly noted concern in 
this regard when construing the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1): 
The issue is not before us, but we assume it 
is unlikely that a district judge would 
reject a magistrate [judge]'s proposed 
findings on credibility when those findings 
are dispositive and substitute the judge's 
own appraisal; to do so without seeing and 
hearing the witness or witnesses whose 
credibility is in question could well give 
rise to serious questions which we do not 
reach. 
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681 n.7, reh'g denied, 
448 U.S. 916 (1980) (a district court may accept a magistrate 
judge's recommendation without conducting a de novo hearing).   
 Our judicial system affords deference to the finder of 
fact who hears the live testimony of witnesses because of the 
opportunity to judge the credibility of those witnesses. 
Blackburn, 630 F.2d at 1109.  The magistrate judge believed Hill 
when he said he did not understand his constitutional rights at 
the time he entered his plea.  The district court, however, made 
credibility determinations without hearing the testimony of the 
witnesses in direct contravention of the credibility 
determinations implicit in the magistrate judge's Report and 
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Recommendation.  Thus, the district court erred in conducting its 
de novo review without hearing the testimony and viewing the 
witnesses when it was reviewing questions of fact which 
necessitated resolving credibility issues. 
 
B.   
 While acknowledging Hill's testimony at that 
evidentiary hearing that he did not know that he was waiving his 
constitutional rights, the district court concluded that the 
"sworn testimony of John L. Madden, Esq. -- an individual 
intimately involved with the guilty plea of Darryl Hill --further 
bolsters the fact that Mr. Hill's guilty plea was voluntary and 
knowing."  February 2, 1994 Memorandum and Order at 9.  In so 
finding the district court ignored the credibility determinations 
made by the magistrate judge respecting Hill's testimony that he 
did not understand his rights.  The magistrate judge relied on 
Hill's testimony that:   
I understood . . . to the extent of what Mr. 
Madden was attempting to do.  I understood 
that these were things that were in court 
proceedings.  But as to what my 
constitutional rights were, what this -- that 
this -- that this word trial, was something 
that was not given to me what was mine.  It 
was a right that was mine, that was given to 
me by the Constitution of the United States. 
Not that Mr. Madden had the power to give me 
that right.   
 
I understand now, like I didn't then.  That 
my right to confront and cross examine my 
accusers was something that Mr. Madden 
couldn't give me, but it was a right that the 
United States gave me. 
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(Tr. 62).  And further, 
 
As far as me knowingly, knowingly know that I 
can walk into the courtroom and say, no I'm 
not accepting this [plea], that I want a 
trial.  I want to take it to trial.  I want 
to take my chances at trial.  I did not have 
that knowledge at the time, that I had the 
authority to do that. 
 
 And what trial consisted of. 
 
(Tr. 92).  The plea colloquy in fact buttresses this testimony 
given that there is no mention of Hill's constitutional right to 
a jury trial.  See supra at 7-9.   
 The district court nonetheless relied on Madden's 
testimony regarding his general practice of meeting with his 
client to discuss the elements of the crime and all possible 
defenses.  Remarkably, the quoted passage in that regard ends 
with Madden's statement that: 
I honestly do not know if I specifically 
articulated to Mr. Hill that he had a right 
to a jury trial.  We discussed trial, and --
and specifically when his trial would be in 
relation to a -- the co-defendant. 
 
(Emphasis added.) February 2, 1994 Memorandum and Opinion at 8. 
Despite this statement, the district court accepted Madden's 
testimony as to what Madden believed Hill understood regarding 
his constitutional rights based on the correspondence between 
Madden and Hill.   
 Madden testified: 
Q: Now, there's several references in the 
letters to Mr. Hill that you have, to a 
trial. 
Madden:  Yes. 
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Q. Did Mr. Hill ever say that he didn't 
understand that?  What a trial was, what a 
jury trial was? 
 
Madden:  No.  And in fact, we wrote a letter 
agreeing that it would make sense not to be 
tried first.  He -- my very, very strong 
sense of the -- of the matter was that he 
knew full well that he was awaiting trial, a 
trial for murder.  
 
 . . . . 
 
Q. Would you have -- was it your belief 
that at the time of the plea, Mr. Hill knew 
the rights that he was waiving? 
 
 . . . . 
 
THE COURT:  Did you believe he understood his 
rights, and what he waiving? 
 
Madden:  Certainly.  I -- I believed it then, 
I continue to believe it today. 
 
(Tr. 120-21).  In accepting this testimony, the district court 
implicitly rejected that portion of Hill's testimony that the 
magistrate judge characterized as "Hill's uncontroverted 
testimony that he was not aware of the rights he was waiving when 
he plead guilty."  Report and Recommendation at 15. 
 The district court also reviewed all of the 
correspondence between Hill and Madden but specifically relied on 
Madden's October 11, 1979 letter to Hill's mother, where he 
explained that he advised Hill to go to trial as it would not do 
Hill any good to plead guilty without a recommendation on his 
sentence; Madden's October 25, 1979 letter to Hill, stating that 
the state would not enter into any plea and discussing arguments 
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for trial; and Hill's November 10, 1979 letter to Madden, where 
Hill stated: 
I receive[d] your letter explaining the 
prosecutors agreement with you concerning the 
advantage of waiting until the trigger man[] 
has his trial. 
  
However, the proposed term of 20-25 years, 
seems inappropriate. . . . 
 
 . . . . 
 
I think a sentence of 10-15 years would seem 
reasonable to me.   
 
Is it possible for you to continue your 
efforts on this plea bargain? 
 
As I said before, I too think it would be 
better to wait until after the "trigger["] 
man gets his trial. 
 
(Emphasis added).  (RA 56-57).  Conspicuously absent from the 
district court's discussion, however, was Madden's November 6 
letter to Hill where Madden raised the potential of a plea with a 
recommendation on sentence of 20-25 years in return for Hill's 
testimony against the trigger man.   
 The district court characterized Hill's November 10 
letter as a response to Madden's "letter of October 25, 1979 - a 
letter which stated that Mr. Hill's trial should be after the 
trigger man's for tactical considerations."  February 2, 1994 
Memorandum and Opinion at 6.  From this presumption, the district 
court concluded that the November 10 letter evidenced that Hill 
voluntarily pursued a guilty plea and possessed an intelligent 
awareness of his rights and options.  It is patently evident, 
however, that Hill's letter dated November 10, 1979 is responsive 
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to Madden's November 6, 1979 letter, not his October 25 letter. 
The November 6 letter is the only letter from Madden that 
references the prosecution's discussion of a plea with a sentence 
of 20-25 years in return for Hill's testimony against the trigger 
man.  When viewed in its proper context, Hill's November 10 
letter is nothing more than a response to Madden's November 6 
letter requesting Hill's thoughts on the plea option of 20-25 
years.  Thus, the district court's conclusion that Hill's plea 
was voluntary and intelligent based on Hill's inquiry in the 
November 10 letter as to whether Madden could continue his 
efforts on the plea bargain was based on the erroneous finding 
that it was in response to Madden's October 25 letter, which 
unequivocally stated that there would be no plea and discussed 
trial strategy.             
 
IV. 
 We conclude that the district court erred by making 
credibility determinations from its de novo review of the record 
without the benefit of having viewed the witnesses' demeanor.  As 
well, the district court erred in basing its denial of the 
petition in critical part on clearly erroneous factual 
determinations.   
 Accordingly, we will vacate the district court's 
judgment and remand to the district court for further review. The 
district court must hold an evidentiary hearing if its review 
involves resolving the credibility of witnesses who testified 
before the magistrate judge; however, if the erroneous factual 
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determinations we discuss, concerning issues that do not call a 
witnesses' credibility into question, were the dispositive 
factors for the district court's denial of the petition, an 
evidentiary hearing may not be required.   
 
  
_________________________ 
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SAROKIN, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
 I agree with the majority's conclusion that "the district court erred by making 
credibility determinations from its de novo review of the record without the benefit of 
having viewed the witnesses' demeanor" and that many of the district court's factual 
findings were clearly erroneous.  Maj. Op. at   [Typescript at 23].  However, I dissent 
because I disagree with the majority's resolution of the case.  Instead of vacating and 
remanding to the district court for further review, id., I would reverse and remand for 
the district court to grant Hill's habeas petition.  Based upon a review of the record, I 
believe that Hill has met his burden of showing that his guilty plea was not knowingly and 
voluntarily entered.  Specifically, I conclude that the factual findings of the district 
court were clearly erroneous, and I would adopt the factual findings and credibility 
determinations of the magistrate judge, who actually held an evidentiary hearing, in 
support of my conclusion that Hill's petition should be granted. 
 The district court, based on its de novo review of the record, determined that 
Hill's guilty plea was constitutionally valid, even though the trial judge had failed to 
advise Hill of any of his Boykin rights and even though the magistrate judge, after an 
evidentiary hearing, concluded that Hill's guilty plea was constitutionally invalid.  The 
magistrate judge relied on: (1) Hill's uncontroverted testimony at the hearing that he was 
not aware of the rights he was waiving when he pled guilty; (2) Hill's limited education; 
(3) a prior criminal history which does not indicate a familiarity with this particular
area of the law; (4) Hill's former attorney's testimony that he cannot specifically recall 
advising Hill of his rights, but that he generally discusses these rights with his 
clients; (5) the state trial judge's failure to apprise Hill of the litany of rights he 
would be waiving by pleading guilty; and (6) a plea form that did not contain an 
exposition of these rights.   
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 For reasons to be discussed, I conclude that the district court's factual 
findings concerning the voluntariness of Hill's guilty plea were clearly erroneous.  
Furthermore, I believe that the magistrate judge's factual findings and credibility 
determinations, which were based on an evidentiary hearing, were essentially correct and 
that these findings lead to the inescapable conclusion that Hill's guilty plea is 
constitutionally invalid. 
 The district court relied heavily on the correspondence between Hill and his 
attorney.  However, the correspondence between Hill's former attorney and Hill makes no 
mention of Hill's constitutional rights or that those rights are waived by pleading 
guilty.  Although the correspondence does discuss a hypothetical jury trial, it does not 
specifically mention that Hill has the right to a jury trial and that this right is waived 
by pleading guilty.  Notably, at the time of the correspondence, Hill was reading at a 
seventh grade level.  Moreover, even were we to find that an attorney's mere mention of 
the word "jury" in correspondence with a defendant is sufficient to apprise a defendant of 
his constitutional right to a jury trial and that this right is waived by pleading guilty, 
under Boykin a defendant must understand and appreciate the entire panoply of rights that 
he is about to waive by pleading guilty.  Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243-44.  In the 
correspondence, there is no evidence of a waiver of the privilege against self-
incrimination or of the right to confront one's accusers.  In fact, there is no evidence 
of knowledge or waiver of these two rights by the defendant anywhere else in the record.
   Furthermore, Hill testified at the evidentiary hearing that at the time he 
entered his guilty plea he did not know of the constitutional rights he was waiving by 
pleading guilty. Hill's testimony that he was unaware of these rights went uncontroverted.  
 Hill's former attorney testified at the hearing that his standard practice was 
to advise clients of their constitutional rights, but that he could not remember whether 
he advised Hill of these rights.  I conclude that the district court erroneously relied on 
the attorney's testimony that he believed Hill was aware of his constitutional rights, 
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notwithstanding that the attorney admitted he could not remember whether he advised Hill 
of his rights or that these rights would be waived by pleading guilty.     
 Additionally, the state trial judge failed to advise Hill of any of his 
constitutional rights, and, thus, the plea colloquy does not establish that Hill knew of 
the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty.  Therefore, the district 
court's reliance on the plea colloquy to establish that Hill knowingly and voluntarily 
waived his constitutional rights when pleading guilty was in error.   
 The following findings of the magistrate judge lend further support to the 
conclusion that Hill's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary.  Defendant in the 
instant case had no previous experience with the criminal justice system which would show 
an independent awareness of the rights that were waived. Hill had never participated in a 
jury trial, either as a defendant or as a witness.  Hill was charged with several offenses 
as a juvenile but was never advised of his constitutional rights in connection with those 
charges and never served a prison sentence.  Hill's adult criminal record consisted of one 
conviction for shoplifting for which Hill pled guilty; Hill was fined and received one 
year of probation.  Hill was never advised of his constitutional rights in connection with 
his conviction for shoplifting.  Finally, the plea form signed by Hill did not contain an 
exposition of the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty.  
 In sum, after a careful examination of the record, I am firmly convinced that 
the district court's findings concerning the voluntariness of Hill's guilty plea were 
clearly erroneous. I believe that Hill has sustained his burden of showing that he was 
neither aware of nor understood the constitutional rights which he waived by pleading 
guilty, and, thus, his plea was not knowing and voluntary and is invalid.  As the 
magistrate judge in the instant case recommended, Hill's guilty plea and conviction should 
be set aside, and the case remanded to the state court to afford Hill the opportunity to 
plead anew.  A further hearing before the district court would serve no purpose because 
all of the relevant facts have been presented and appropriate findings made therefrom.
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